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[–]parlor_tricks 68 points69 points ago*

TLDR: You assume that knowing the base facts will predict behavior. Behavior involves more than just the internal brain. Knowing the insides will not predict the reactions. Also: even if you know all the basic parts, those parts can create complexity which you can't fathom.

tldr tldr:

1) Given all knowledge of the parts, does not imply ALL knowledge of the system and its outputs.

2) Complex systems can (and do) create unpredictable/non deterministic outputs and outcomes (climate vs weather for example)

Therefore, Given 2), the professor is correct in stating that we will not know everything about the brain and behavior. Given 1) and 2) we will know an awful lot about behavior and the underlying systems, but our knowledge is upper limited by our inability to predict the outcomes of complex systems.


Your professor is likely right - basically you are arguing the reductionist standpoint (iirc that is the correct ism). Well that is wishful thinking. Even if we know everything at a fundamental level, that does not mean we will understand how the systems they generate interact.

Further in your chain (quarks->.....-> behavior...)

The leaps between fields of science is so major, the impact of each layer on the next so varied, that you may as well be accused of scientific mysticism.

For example, the effect of quarks on the formation of particles is fascinating, but its impact on neurobiology; oblique. While there will be the edge cases where quantum physics is important, the larger body of NB would be involved with the reactions and chemicals it comes up with on its own.

Further just understanding NB won't make you understand how thoughts are created or how they interact or how that effects behavior. To do that you would also have to tack on several other branches giving you:

thoughts->behavior<-economics<-sociology, just as an example.

In the end, even if you tacked on every branch of science to finally help you predict behavior you would kick yourself because:

1) if you only want to focus on behavior you could have your answer without neurobio, 2) Some things would have random outcomes

[–]temporalanomaly 2 points3 points ago

I would not even discount the reductionist standpoint, but rather argue that because of the complexity involved, it is simply impossible to comprehend something on a basic enough level in the detail necessary to make adequate extrapolations and explanations for behavior.

[–]hglman 3 points4 points ago

No it just requires a lot of time to understand it.

[–]sambowilkins 8 points9 points ago

Some things would have random outcomes

This is a very controversial problem so I don't think its safe to say out right that there is randomness in the universe. Randomness implies a level of non-causality that would undermine a lot of our understanding of our universe.

In a world with perfect knowledge one should be able to examine the parts (neurobiology, sociology, chemistry) and predict the behavior. If that cannot be done it is due to either imperfect knowledge or a fundamentally non-causal universe.

[–]parlor_tricks 1 point2 points ago*

The famous quote you want is Einstein saying that he doesn't believe god plays dice.

Also the Heisenberg uncertainty principle pretty much suggests that at some level you won't be able to know everything. At the same time, with statistical analysis, you will be able to determine patterns.

The thing is that some systems, with simple rules can lead to u predictable behavior. Take conways game of life for example. Or the halting problem, which basically shows us that we can't ever know if a program will Run on a given input.

Heck even just a simple game with multiple partners and feedback loops makes for a dynamic system who's outcome/state is not predictable.

[–]gleon 0 points1 point ago

Or the halting problem, which basically shows us that we can't ever know if a program will Run on a given input.

This is a false statement. The theorem of the undecidability of the halting problem (proven by Turing) states that there is no general solution to the halting problem, i.e. that there is no algorithm that can determine whether an arbitrary algorithm halts on arbitrary input. For certain specific problems, the halting problem is most certainly solvable but a proof must be constructed manually for each new algorithm. Also, Turing's undecidability result applies only to Turing machines, a specific model of computation (albeit, a very important one, since it is the model equivalent to our modern computers). For certain simpler models of computation, the halting problem is solvable in a general way.

To expand some more on the construction of halting proofs for specific algorithms, it is also important to note that there is a field called automated termination analysis which uses certain heuristics (methods that are not guaranteed to deliver a correct solution but are a good enough "approximation" that they work in many cases) to attempt to derive automated halting proofs. This method has been proven very successful for a large body of common programs.

The undecidability of the general halting problem is a very important and fundamental theoretical result, but it does not leave us in the dark as much as your comment seems to imply.

EDIT: spelling mistake

[–]parlor_tricks 1 point2 points ago

Thanks, expanded on something I hadn't heard since my last cs class. Yes, it does in many cases reduce the envelope of knowable inputs.

I am not aiming for a scare mongering " oh there's the unknowable! " superstitious approach. I am however arguing against the reductionist standpoint which is the essence of the authors stand."

[–]gleon 0 points1 point ago

The intent of my comment was primarily to expand on the quite interesting case of the halting problem for archiving purposes, if anyone ever reads this thread. :-)

I am not aiming for a scare mongering " oh there's the unknowable! " superstitious approach. I am however arguing against the reductionist standpoint which is the essence of the authors stand."

I think we are actually mostly in agreement, if I were to judge by original explanation to the OP which I find reasonable. I can't help but think that perhaps the OP and his professor simply misunderstood each other more than they realised.

[–]gleon 0 points1 point ago

Also the Heisenberg uncertainty principle pretty much suggests that at some level you won't be able to know everything.

This is true from our current theoretical standpoint, but it should be mentioned that it has not yet been determined what role (if any) quantum effects play in the brain. Put simply, because of a phenomenon called quantum decoherence, quantum effects diminish when they interact with the environment and this is the reason why we do not experience such effects in our everyday lives.

[–]parlor_tricks 1 point2 points ago*

I'm not arguing that quantum effects determine thinking or influence it greatly.

" suggests that at some level you won't know everything" is the simple point.

I also agree with the point you raise. If our wetwork was at the mercy of quantum activity I would be very surprised.

I think you are, in your two comments, arguing a modified version of reductionist thinking: some things may not be known, but they can be approximated.

In which case I offer godel Escher Bach.

Edit: is this thread still alive?

[–]gleon 0 points1 point ago

" suggests that at some level you won't know everything" is the simple point.

Fair enough.

I think you are, in your two comments, arguing a modified version of reductionist thinking: some things may not be known, but they can be approximated.

Yes, this is a fairly good summary. Also, I am not arguing what I can only call "strict" reductionism; the idea that there is a strict 1-to-1 correlation between brain states and mental states (in mathematical terms, that there is a bijection between the two). I have often encountered this meaning of the word in works by opponents of reductionism and I find it quite peculiar and confusing that someone would take the bare term to mean this. It would be apsurd to claim this since there are still so many unknowns in the brain, not to mention that it would be rather extraordinary if this was the case, given the incredible amount of possible brain states and (comparatively) few discernible mental states. What I find almost certain, on the other hand, is that mental states supervene on the brain states (and those on physical laws).

To be honest, I am a bit baffled by how many debates over this are because the terms are not defined precisely enough. I almost feel like many so-called reductionists understand the simple notion that it is, in most cases, unfavourable or even practically impossible to explain high-level human behaviour by observing the individual physical/chemical evolution of the brain system. It is only in principle that this should be possible, barring some still undiscovered phenomenological domain which is completely separate and orthogonal to laws of physics (and this already is borderline mysticism since it would seem that even such a domain would be subject to certain rules which would just become the extended rules of physics). This is not a trivial proposition as it might sound at first, since if this was not the case, we would have something truly strange on our hands, unexplorable by conventional empiricism alone. I find arguments such as "it is hard to understand the true intention behind a program from its machine code" (mentioned elsewhere in the thread) unsatisfying since no one is saying that it wouldn't be excrutiatingly hard to do so, but to imply otherwise seems to me to warrant strangeness such as described above. The fact that higher-level fields such as economics and sociology have their own emergent, discoverable rules does not imply that it would not be possible to extrapolate those from the complete physical rules of nature, using logic alone.

That said, the notion that we will someday conflate all those fields to physics and just calculate from there seems just as aspurd once you've experienced the complexity yourself.

In which case I offer godel Escher Bach.

It's been on my reading list for a while, but I haven't had the time to read it yet.

[–]sambowilkins 1 point2 points ago

But that was in response to the probabilistic nature of quantum physics. Probability, while not the Newtonian poster child cause and effect, is still indicative of a causal universe. Randomness would have to show no patterns.

Additionally it would be impossible to prove that a string of numbers is truly random with out an infinite sample set. Thus randomness in the universe is basically impossible to prove.

[–]morph89 1 point2 points ago

By the same logic, randomness in the universe would be in impossible to disprove.

[–]LesMisIsRelevant 3 points4 points ago

Major strawman. Just because one assumes that, given all knowledge, behavior could be predicted, does not mean one assumes we will have all this knowledge at any point. That doesn't mean that's it is irreducibly complex, and that thus these predictions could never be made, and to suggest otherwise is incredibly dishonest.

TL;DR: This does not kill the thread.

[–]parlor_tricks 0 points1 point ago

I'm saying that even given all knowledge prognostication is still a crap shoot because all knowledge of the parts doesn't mean all knowledge of the way the system they create will behave.

[–]Epoh 0 points1 point ago

Given all knowledge that can be conceived we cannot fathom an answer. But say we knew all the workings of the internal state from quarks to behavior, we'd still have to account for experience and its effect on a person that would be unique to each unique internal state. Knowing the inner is certainly more than half the battle in explaining mind and behavior, but its far from all of it.

External influence boiled down is simply quarks as well, but of a potentially vast difference than the internal we claim we would know. Its reactions at multiple levels inner and outer.

[–]parlor_tricks 0 points1 point ago

Right. Knowing the insides is one thing, but it definitely won't take you from thought-> behavior.

Behavior is determined by external factors and heck, at that level thought isn't mind as much as it is mind-body, which would mean adding another layer: neuro+bio. In reality the op's hypothesis would end up requiring a full knowledge of everything to be able to answer the vary large set which hides behind the word "behavior". And then you get hit by the emergent properties of complex systems.

If the op reduced his final set to a subset of all behavior, then you can make some predictions. Even then he can hit a wall.

[–]Epoh 0 points1 point ago

Yup. Physical incapabilities to say play basketball would dramatically alter your thoughts but your thoughts would merely be the by product of the quarks reacting with this handicap. This thought by product would then come to effect behavior and maybe make you stay away from the courts, or try harder. Very general basic explanation that scrapes the surface of a fleck of skin. How the external process connects with the inner down to the molecular level noone knows really.

Noone rly discussed the external effect from what i had read which is suprising to me. Knowing everything is so naive if its only the inner workings, BUT i suppose if you understand the workings of quarks and their formulas, than you could walk down the path of grasping anything the mind could conceive that it confronts. Youd be able to make sense of it from your end assuming you know everything, but the workings of the external ive got no fucking clue.

[–]parlor_tricks 0 points1 point ago

Agree with your first sentence: , all knowledge is a hypothetical we are assuming based on the op's post.

your second statement I find doesn't follow what I'm saying. I'm pointing out that simple systems can have unpredictable outcomes or dynamic equilibriums, take for example conways game of life or even the halting problem or rices theorem.

This is to adress the the point which the op made regarding his professors mysticism.

Now to adress your point, yes I agree that we can reach and make certain predictions, and that certain new predictions can be made at are not possible today.

As the original point was the fact that the professor was dating that some things were unknowable and e op was arguing against, I aimed to clarify that yes the professor had it right. This of course ignores the fact that there are more positions than just the two given above.

[–]WolfInTheField 1 point2 points ago

Well, that killed the thread. Awesome explanation btw.

[–]parlor_tricks 2 points3 points ago

Hey thanks! Glad people found it useful.

[–]JorusC 0 points1 point ago

And that doesn't even take into account quantum mechanics, which would have a notable effect on molecular interactions within individual neurons. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle alone guarantees that the original argument - that we could know how everything in the brain is working at some given time - is impossible. We could never know both the location and trajectory of each neurotransmitter molecule, which would be required to predict a behavior.

Not to mention, simply observing the brain might well change the way it behaves. The universe, it seems, is designed to baffle the human mind.

[–]banjaloupe -1 points0 points ago

Err, doesn't the uncertainty principle only apply to particles, not molecules? It's been a while since I took physics so I might be off. I'm just pretty sure we can simultaneously observe the position/momentum of molecules...

[–]JorusC -1 points0 points ago

Yeah, but molecules are made of wild bunches of interacting particles. You can't tell from moment to moment where a given electron is. Thus, it's impossible to accurately measure the dipole of the molecule in any given instant, which determines its magnetic potential and thus its orientation in relation to all the other polar molecules around it. Especially in a fluid system.

Chemistry as a field just shrugs and takes the average, but we're now talking about the firing of single neurons, which can be guided by minute amounts of neurotransmitter. A neurotransmitter being oriented one way instead of another could affect a behavior, at least in a small way.

[–]t0c 0 points1 point ago

Your theory will work if we can find evidence of any quantum-level interactions within/by neurons. For example we (scientists really) suspect we use quantum mechanic mechanism to smell. I forget what it's called again, but the idea was that our noses try to force an electron through (maybe it was across, I'm clueless as to quantum mechanics) a particle (quantum tunnelling?) depending on the level of energy needed to do so, you get a different smell. Or so the theory goes. (source) But it would explain why we have so few receptors in our noses and yet we can smell a lot more (compared to receptors) odours. I've not heard of anything similar in regards to neural activity. So far all I've learned is about chemical reactions and "lock'n'key" synaptic activity. If these reactions use quantum effects to happen, that still won't impact the neural activity. So while we can't say they don't exist, we can't make suppositions that they do either. At least, not us armchair internets people. AKA: The bigger we go the more accurate things become.

I'd be interested if there's any sourcing material for your idea that electrons can change the polarity of a molecule. From what I've learned, this doesn't happen. Given my knowledge of chemistry is really quite limited.

[–]gleon 0 points1 point ago

It has not yet been determined what role quantum mechanics play in cognition and the mechanics of the brain (though it is certainly possible that such a role exists). Most of the examples you mention would have a hard time displaying great quantum effects because of interactions with the environment.

[–]hot4belgians 5 points6 points ago

Initially I though you'd answered your own question. If you know everything about the brain's function then you, by definition of knowing everything, know how behaviour works. Of course this would only be true if all that 'behaved' was the brain. As stupid as this may sound, your arms move and your gut digests food, they'll do different things in response to different stimuli which may be governed by the brain, but if you only knew everything about the brain that wouldn't be enough to know about that.

Say you have Myasthenia gravis and your brain is just like anyone else's (It probably wouldn't be but i don't know enough about that). You can't behave in the same way as someone who is shocked. If you have multiple sclerosis, you wont feel a very hot plate. Again i probably sound pedantic because that's to do with the spinal cord and not the brain, I assume you meant central nervous system? Even so that isn't enough.

what you should really say is that if you knew everything about how the human body works, then you'd understand how behaviour works. Though in saying that you would be saying you know how behaviour works...

[–]Dangger 5 points6 points ago

Check out this idea on emergence:

emergence is the way complex systems and patterns arise out of a multiplicity of relatively simple interactions. Emergence is central to the theories of integrative levels and of complex systems.

In other words, the sum of the parts is more than the whole. A lot of people have elaborated much better in this thread on why the basic answer is not really, you wouldn't be able to predict behavior, but no one mentioned emergence, which is a concept that I rather like.

[–]shadyturnip 11 points12 points ago

I think you're assuming that there's a straight connection between each level and the level above it. You may want to look into some philosophy of science in reductionism and the relation of the special sciences between levels.

The simple answer is that it may not at all - emergent properties from complex systems aren't necessarily understood by appeal to the underlying rules. On top of this, the granularity of the explanation may not fit - let us assume for the moment that there is a perfect match between levels; this might allow us to describe economics through physics, but would you want to? Would you gain any knowledge from that? Would you understand it any better by being able to explain it in a more basic sense?

And this relies on the assumption that there's a perfect correlation between each level, which does not appear to be the case. I recommend reading Jerry Fodor's excellent paper Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis), and reading the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (SEP) pages.

Though this might be off-base and not answering your actual intended question, I hope this helps.

[–]Glucksberg 2 points3 points ago

On top of this, the granularity of the explanation may not fit - let us assume for the moment that there is a perfect match between levels; this might allow us to describe economics through physics, but would you want to? Would you gain any knowledge from that? Would you understand it any better by being able to explain it in a more basic sense?

I've always advocated going back to a gravitation standard of currency.

[–]shadyturnip 2 points3 points ago

A currency backed by Higgs bosons? Sounds like Ron Paul's 2024 campaign.

[–]cbogart 6 points7 points ago

I think behavior is tricky to understand because it's not just governed by neurobiology, but also by continuous input and feedback from the environment. We live in a world with a lot of patterns to it, and our brains both influence, and adapt to, those patterns. So to understand a person's behavior, you'd have to understand not just their neurobiology, but also the kinds of patterns in their environment that they've learned to adapt to. And a lot of those environmental influences are feedback from the person's own prior behaviors. For example you'd have to understand sociology to know what influences there are a person's future behavior, but you can't build sociology from the ground up without understanding psychology. So trying to predict a person's behavior with a neurobiological model is unrealistic.

I'd go slightly farther than that, and say it's not even possible in principle: it's faster to just wait and see what an organism does than it would be possible to simulate it with the fastest physically possible computer. Therefore we have to study behavior directly; we'll never be able to derive everything useful we want to know from neurobiology.

So in any meaningful sense, knowing everything about the brain can't tell us how behavior works.

[–]Paul-ish 6 points7 points ago

As a computer scientist sometime I think about the human body vs a computer. If someone gave one of the brilliant thinkers of the past, say descartes, complete knowledge of the physical workings of a computer (electrons, magnetism, mechanics of a hard drive spindle, etc...) would or could he completely understand that computer?

I would argue not really. He would find things like "Oh, when plug this peripheral (mouse) in the I can get things on the display to flash, and I can clearly see movement of electrons!" For the most part though, the computer would remain a mystery. There is simply too much data. This is because a computer is built on abstractions. Few people actually code binary 1s and 0s anymore, and few people still code assembly. Most people use modern programming languages along with common and useful idioms to achieve their goals. It is to be understood from a macroscopic level, from a distance, and not from the electrons moving through the computer. The abstraction that high level languages provides allows for more flexible thinking.

In a similar way, understanding the biophysics of the human brain doesn't necessarily mean we will understand everything about the brain, although may be a necessary (but not sufficient) criteria. It just doesn't explain some phenomena as cleanly as a more abstract and macroscopic cognitive approach might. "Why do I get anxious around this one pretty girl?" is a question that you might be able to answer with physics, but would make more sense to think about the abstractions of cognitive and behavioral psychology. Just as an engineer doesn't use particle physics to build a bridge, I do not think psychologists will need particle physics to understand the human brain.

Even if we assume the work is deterministic, it is useful to take a more approximate approach in most cases. What you view as mysticism can be useful abstraction in my opinion.

[–]squeevey 3 points4 points ago

I agree with what i THINK you are saying.

Assume the universe is composed of a finite set of 'elementary' (non-reducable) particles

and

You know how each particle interacts with other particles

And you exist OUTSIDE of the universe of these particles.

Then you can determine at time T what that universe would look like.

However, this requires you to NOT be part of the 'universe'. It is necessary to be omnipotent.

[–]Theodore_Brosevelt 2 points3 points ago

This actually relates to two of my favorite sayings:

"Can't see the forest for the trees", and "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts"

Essentially, just knowing all the factors doesn't mean you can fully understand the end result. Because to understand particles, you have to know how quarks interact. To know how molecules interact, you have to know how particles interact, and so on. It stands to reason that in order to truly understand behavior, you'd have to understand how thoughts interact. I'm not saying it's impossible to understand, just that we don't understand it yet.

[–]fwaht 3 points4 points ago*

Yes, if you know everything about the physical reality for something, you will know how everything, subsumed by your knowledge, behaves unless it's somehow indeterministic. And even then you can likely know with great likelihood what will happen--although, it depends on how significant the indeterministic effects are. The reason being is that we live in a physical universe such that we find physicalism is the only likely explanation for the nature of reality.

So, are there neurobiological models that predict behavior? Yes. The obvious example is if a region of your brain is destroyed you will behave differently, and neurobiology and related fields (e.g., comparative neuropsychology) could predict the changed behavior and tell you why.

It seems no one in here has heard of transcranial magnetic stimulation research, affective neuroscience, neuroeconomics, or quantative genetics. We predict if a fetus is likely to display symptoms in adulthood associated with ASPD if it has a gene called MAO-A. I.e., we know it's more likely to display aggressive behavior.

Your professor sounds like a crank Cartesian dualist.

(And none of this is to discount the large role environment plays. E.g., you can know how a simple toy boat that you made behaves in the idealistic system you dreamt it up in your head, but you need a perfect understanding of the environment to predict that it's going to be destroyed by a meteor instead of reaching the other side of the pond. But you still know how the boat behaves ceteris paribus, and you even know how the boat behaves given X. You just don't know what X necessarily is going to be unless you also understand what underlies X.)

[–]firepile 4 points5 points ago

Your professor sounds like a crank Cartesian dualist.

One doesn't need to be a dualist to be aware of the compete reality of the explanatory gap. We don't know how thoughts and phenomenology reduce to brain yet. Even if we believe they do, and that we'll figure it out (which is already a big jump) that doesn't change the fact that there's a gap between the objective explanation and the subjective experience that we have absolutely no way to close right now.

[–]fwaht -2 points-1 points ago*

This made perfect sense to me but the professor seems to think that simply knowing how everything works isn't enough to understand behavior.

Nope, crank Cartesian dualist or an extemporaneous thought showing ignorance.

Even if we believe they do, and that we'll figure it out (which is already a big jump) that doesn't change the fact that there's a gap between the objective explanation and the subjective experience that we have absolutely no way to close right now.

It ain't a big jump. Please do the bayesian math. Also, you're so vague that I have no idea what you mean by "gap between objective explanation and subjective experience." Give me an example of a subjective experience that can't be explained objectively.

[–]displacingtime 2 points3 points ago

You'd be surprised how many people who are generally very scientific have some dualism leanings.

I agree with you, but I suppose we can't prove it until we know everything about how the brain works. Until we get the science to back it it's about philosophical differences.

[–]TheBrohemian 2 points3 points ago

IN THEORY, I think the answer is yes. But because the firing of every neuron in your brain is dependent on the excitatory and inhibitory signals it's getting from neurons around it, the application of this knowledge just isn't practical. If somebody asks you about a certain behavior, you would have to think about every signal every neuron is getting.

If I'm wrong, someone please correct me.

[–]unampho 4 points5 points ago*

There isn't much comfort in hard science. Unfortunately, people tend toward mysticism because it is comfortable. I would say that the computation for behavior analysis from the bottom up would be horrible. However, that's merely a technological problem. For now, though, keep in mind that one could still pull out meaningful "Thermodynamic-like" variables with which to analyze behavior, and still eradicate mysticism. Imagine a temperature-like variable by which you could study impulsive tendancies.

Edit: To respond simply: You'd probably be able to predict behavior, given adequate starting condition knowledge, but it might not be necessary if you looked at the data in a different way. Some behaviors, however, might be chaotic and have too great a sensitivity to small changes in initial conditions.

[–]drent89 3 points4 points ago

You might find this article interesting, it is probably the most famous refutation of reductionist thinking to explain neuroscience. It is by Thomas Nagel and asks the question what is it like to be a bat? Even if we knew all the science behind what makes a bat brain a bat brain would we really know what it is like to be a bat? No, there are phenomenological experiences that we can never understand from a purely reductionist view point, therefore it can never give a complete description of the mid. http://organizations.utep.edu/Portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf

[–]engelthefallen 2 points3 points ago

My mentor and I argued so much over this because I think with virtual reality in the next 50 years using sensory modification we can do it fairly well.

Kathleen Akins has the best reply to the bat analogy using neuro route. Crappy scan, but great article.

http://cnp.igc.gulbenkian.pt/_media/pgcn/course/neurophilosophy_neuroethology_senses/internal/akins.pdf

[–]drent89 2 points3 points ago

Thanks for the article, it was really interesting. I do however disagree that virtual reality will help us solve the explanatory gap in neuroscience. If for example I could record the phenomenological experience of a bat (or more realistically let's say a schizophrenic) and play that recording back on my own brain, I think I could safely say that I could have that experience and understand what that qualia is like. However, I do not think the ability to record and play back qualia brings us any closer to being able to explain mechanistically how neurophysiology produces phenomenological experience. Why do certain electrochemical circuits produce feelings of paranoia, or feelings at all, this is the question that Nagel claims neuroscience may never answer, and I think I agree.

I know the article also mentions Dennett and Churchland who simply discount qualia on account there is no way to test qualia and we have no evidence that it even exists. While both are geniuses and much smarter than me, I just can't accept that argument as it seems so counter-intuitive to subjective conscious experience. But who knows.

[–]engelthefallen 1 point2 points ago

There is a lot of discussion about that Nagal article around. Very polarizing piece that seems to divide people deeply on whether or not it is possible and why. I feel people subjectively label certain experiences when faced with ambiguous information. See this a lot and most clearly in the field of paranormal studies. Def worth taking a quick look around the net for other articles if you dig it as many people examined the bat issue from many different points of view. Such a simple question that generates a lot of discussion.

Here is a page with a sample of other papers about it.

http://philpapers.org/rec/NAGWII

[–]drent89 0 points1 point ago

Thanks for the links. I think it is definitely a controversial issue. I don't think there is enough information right now for one side to claim victory. It's a fun topic to debate and study, but only time will tell if we ever achieve a completed neuroscience.

[–]fwaht 0 points1 point ago*

Nagel's position is a minority position in philosophy of mind, and there's been three decades of argument that could tell you exactly why. Daniel Dennett sums up some of the arguments in his books, if you're interested. (You're probably not aware that Nagel was a kind of dualist, and physicalism is the majority view in philosophy now.)

[–]drent89 1 point2 points ago

I am familiar with Dennett's work. I am also aware that Nagel has been called a dualist and I know what a slam that is in modern philosophy of mind. I don't think Nagel would consider himself a dualist though. I think there is a difference (albeit a fuzzy one) from proposing that the mind is made of both material and immaterial substances, and proposing that conventional physiology lacks the tools to adequately explain how consciousness arises from neural matter (or any matter).

I do also admit that Dennett and his fellow reductionists (like the Churchlands) have certainly been the leading voices in Philosophy of Mind for the last couple decades. However, I think a rise in Phenomenology is underway and those like Dennett will continue to face growing criticism. Philosophers like David Chalmers show that qualia cannot be swept under the rug as easily as Dennett would like to contend.

[–]fwaht 0 points1 point ago

Seriously, you think p-zombies are a good argument (I assume that's what you're referring to with Chalmers)? Also, don't you think you were misleading the OP by presenting your favored position by itself rather than placing it in the wider context of modern philosophical thought (E.g., I know most philosophers don't agree with me but...)? And, yeah, Nagel is a property dualist.

[–]drent89 0 points1 point ago

I think p-zombies is a fine argument (as far as I am aware the only refutation of it is to argue that yes we are in fact p-zombies, I could be wrong about this and if you are aware of other arguments I would be interested in hearing them).

I don't think I mislead the OP at all. He asked why would someone argue against a reductionist viewpoint, since that was his view point and his professor disagreed. My answer was an argument that explains why someone would disagree with reductionism. It is a perfectly valid argument, and despite your zealous it has not been completely refuted.

Also, I don't appreciate your condescending tone. Consciousness is far from explained, so the arrogance I detect in your responses is not justified (not that arrogance ever should be, although I guess I should expect it from someone who is such a fan of Dennett :P jk).

[–]fwaht -1 points0 points ago*

Arguments with a posteriori premises or conclusion simplify to Bayesian reasoning. I.e., the premises are inductive or probabilistic which requires a probabilistic conclusion. When putting this argument in the Bayesian framework, you'll find that solomonoff induction (mathematical formalization of occam's razor), background knowledge, and so on make the p-zombie's conclusion very unlikely. This is the same kind of argument you find from people like William Lane Craig, where we're supposed to take a deductive argument (KCA) as forceful because the premises are not certainly wrong (just likely wrong or outweighed by background knowledge, poor explanatory scope, power, ect). You also find this kind of stupid crap in solipsistic arguments or radical skepticism (which also completely fail when simplified or are deobfuscated to a probabilistic framework).

Basically, I find p-zombies laughable for the same reasons I find idealism laughable. You'll also find plenty of good criticisms of p-zombies in its SEP entry.

[–]southernstorm 1 point2 points ago

who gives a shit if its a minority opinion. so was heliocentrism a while back

[–]fwaht 1 point2 points ago

Minority and shrinking since first proposed, should hint you towards some probabilistic reasoning. Should also give you pause for proposing it without context.

[–][deleted] ago

[deleted]

[–]fwaht -1 points0 points ago

I wasn't making the argument that because Nagel's position is a fringe position, therefore it's wrong. I was putting the OP's comment in the wider context of current philosophical thought, for which I think the OP should have done theirself.

Might want to review basic logic...

[–]petejonze 2 points3 points ago*

The reducing of behaviour to biology is what Gilbert Ryle - one of, if not the greatest 20th century British philosophers - termed a Category Mistake.

His example, as I recall, concerned a dignitary visiting Oxford and asking to see the University. After being shown all the libraries, colleges and sports fields he says "That was all very nice, but I wanted to see the university". Such a question expresses a fundamental misunderstanding about what the university is. (Namely a collections of libraries, colleges, sports fields, etc.).

My crude interpretation of this point is that some things can only be sensibly discussed - only have meaning - at a certain level of description. Behaviour is an emergent property of biology, and the way that it emerges is an interesting research question. But the behaviour is not identical with the underlying biology any more than the stockmarket is identical with a host of offices, traders, cars, workshops, staff, desks, computers etc.

Ryle articulates all this much more clearly than I can in his book, The concept of mind.

tl;dr Your professor is correct. (According to Oxford 'ordinary language' philosophers)

EDIT: spelling

EDIT2: a bit more content: Of course, if you want to define, for example, memory as 'that collection of neural responses that occur in situation x' (i.e. in the operational way that is often necessary to form hypotheses) then you can straightforwardly reduce the 'behaviour' of remembering to the biology (well, the physiology technically, but hey ho). But then that isn't what most people mean when they talk about the behaviour associated with remembering. Thus, by redefining the concept of memory you have begged the original question.

[–]fwaht 0 points1 point ago

That's cute how you provide the back story for category mistake but fail to show how this is a category mistake. You're wrong, of course, because we can predict behavioral changes from the biological level.

[–]petejonze 1 point2 points ago

err... if you say so. Like I say, I would recommend the above book.

[–]fwaht -1 points0 points ago

I recommend Neuroscience of Preference and Choice.

[–]petejonze 1 point2 points ago

That's cute

[–]fwaht -1 points0 points ago

Is it? It shows you how we already understand behavior from neurobiological models.

[–]petejonze 1 point2 points ago*

simply knowing how everything works isn't enough to understand behavior

You have presumably taken understand to mean 'can you predict X by Y'. If this is the case then we have no argument. Yes, if to understand X is to be able to predict X by Y, then being able to predict X by Y does mean that we understand X. (Though incidentally, if right here and now you were actually able to predict real-world behaviour with any degree of accuracy then I would love to see your Nobel prize).

My point, and the professor's too I assume, is that to understand what behaviour means is to understand the concept expressed by the word 'behaviour'. That is, to understand what somebody means when they talk about behaviour; to know how the word is used, how it is taught, when it makes sense to say that somebody is behaving in X or Y a way, to know what constitutes this or that behaviour, etc. etc.

My argument is that you cannot understand the concept 'behaviour' by talking in the language in biology. Firstly, since the two frames of references operate at different levels, such that each tells you something interesting, complementary, but functionally different. By analogy, one can completely describe this computer in front of me at some molecular level as such-and-such a set of atoms, arranged in such-and-such a way. One can also describe it in everyday parlance as 'a computer'. Now imagine somebody who wasn't familiar with computers points at the one before me and asks "what's that?". If I gave the molecular description do you think he would be terribly impressed by my deep level of understanding? No, he would think me facetious.

Actually though, you can take the philosophical argument further than this, and say that to talk in terms of biology is not just a category mistake, but that in the case of behaviour the lower level description is actually inappropriate and/or incomplete. In a nutshell, this is because the everyday concept of behaviour is predicated on things logically independent from what is going on inside the body. However, I'm going to stop typing now, since nobody is going to bother reading any of this anyway.

[–]fwaht 0 points1 point ago*

I've taken 'understand' to mean knowing what's in the black box. When we know what's in the black box, we know what comes out of it when we know what's put into it.

Because we understand parts of what's in the blackbox that is the brain, we know what comes out of it when something is put in. The conjunction fallacy, for example. Or speech disorders. Or bonding. Or morality. Or certain decisions. Just look at some TMS research. If we understand a very specific area of the brain, we can predict a very specific change in behavior when it's affected. There's no reason to think that if we completely understood the black box, that we couldn't understand the output. In fact, there's very good reason to think that we could given the examples I listed.

Can we understand ASPD from the biological level? Yes. Can we understand PSTD from the biological level? Yes. Can we understand Piccasso's paintings from the biological level? Yes but it's complicated because his output is largely affected by culture and history, although if we fully understood both of those, we would know what they output when inputted in to Piccasso's brain. It probably wouldn't be horribly efficient to understand his paintings that way, though. I.e., if we fully know the inputs to the blackbox, and we fully understand the blackbox, we will necessarily know the outputs unless there are some hugely significant indeterministic macro level effects that we're not even aware of now.

And for the same reason that we can understand Piccasso's output given that we know his input, we can understand why a person jumps off a bridge. Or why a person beats their wife, and so on.

Do we want to understand things that way? Maybe, maybe not. Could we? Yes, if we hooked a persons sensory modalities with a recording device, we could know every possible input that ever went into their brain, and if we understood their brain, we could predict their next action perfectly. And we could extrapolate their actions from a specific point in time with decreasing accuracy because we wouldn't perfectly understand what the inputs would be ten minutes later. Though, we would perfectly understand the inputs for their very next action.

Every point that you want to make is moot because we already describe behavior at the biological level. See behavioral neuroscience, affective neuroscience, neuroeconomics, quantative genetics, comparative neuropsychology. You're simply wrong.

[–]petejonze 0 points1 point ago*

It follows from your argument that since we currently have very little idea what is in the black box (The fog that is TMS research being an apt case in point!), that we don't understand what it is for somebody to remember something; that we don't know what it is for somebody to be happy or be in pain; that we don't know what it really means to smell a rose or hear a song. Do we understand even a fraction of how speech disorders at the biological level? No. Or bonding? No. Or morality? No. Decision making? No. Of course not, we don't even understand to any great extent the very basic physiology of the human brain (you do know that virtually no neurophys research has ever been done on healthy humans [at least at the cellular level], right?), let alone how complex behaviours emerges. It follows that we are to some extent using all these terms blindly, and that all of our psychological concepts are really just stubs - blank cheques waiting for noble neuroscientists to cash.

If you want to assert all this then fine, just recognise that you are now using these psychological concepts in a different way to how I, the professor, and most other people on the planet use them (for whom such assertions are absurd). Now, if you are using these words in your own way then you can do whatever you want with them and that's fine. You can use them in such a way that the proposition "If you know everything about how the brain works you know how behavior works" is true. Or you can use them in such a way that the proposition is false. Or you can use them in such a way that the proposition makes no sense whatsoever. You can do whatever you like if you are making up the rules, but if you want to play by the rules of everyday discourse then the professor is correct. Want to replace our everyday psychological concepts with ones described at the biological level - go for it! But the point still stands that the professor is correct according to the everyday rules of language.

And by the way, simply asserting that somebody is wrong is not typically accepted as a valid debating tactic. In fact, it is usually considered at best extremely insulting, and at worse a manifestation of a weak mind. I'm sure neither of those apply in the present case though.

[–]fwaht 0 points1 point ago*

"Since we have very little idea"? Where'd you get that from? We understand some things very well, and other things not so well. We know a lot about memory formation, happiness, and pain, for example.

Yes, we can induce aphasia by applying TMS to a specific area of the brain. That's a fraction (significant) of understanding for a speech disorder at the biological level. We also understand a great deal about bonding in that it's contingent on a chemical called oxytocin. Morality is contigent on a module in the brain called theory of mind. People are more violent if they have a gene called MAO-A. System-1 decisions can be predicted before you're consciously aware of them (Libet). We understand large amounts of the brain at the biological level, and it's idiotic to think that we need "cellular level" research to think that we would.

Psychological concepts are stubs for neurologists? Is that what this is about? You're afraid of the harder sciences taking over your turf? I'd hope you'd be more concerned with reality than what you want reality to be.

Behavior or behaviour (see American and British spelling differences) refers to the actions and mannerisms made by organisms, systems, or artificial entities in conjunction with its environment, which includes the other systems or organisms around as well as the physical environment. It is the response of the system or organism to various stimuli or inputs, whether internal or external, conscious or subconscious, overt or covert, and voluntary or involuntary.

Nope, looks like I am using behavior with its common usage. Behavior is the output of the black box. Environment, stimuli, ect are the input. The brain is the partially understood box.

Also, I'm not debating you, I'm teaching you. You are wrong because entire fields have popped up that describe the psychological concept of behavior from a biological level. I mentioned like half a dozen of them.

[–]specialkake 1 point2 points ago

If you had never seen or used a PC, and I taught you electronics, micro and miniature circuit design, binary code, etc. Would you be able to figure out how to navigate the web?

[–]Shpleeurnck[S] 1 point2 points ago

My professor used this same anecdotal proof by asserting that if you know everything about the inner workings of a TV, can you explain why Oprah is on TV right now? This proves his point but I think it makes too many steps between the inner workings of the TV and programming.

Comparing how a PC works and then asking about the internet is like say that the number one is close to the number 1,000 because all the numbers in between are close to each other but skipping all of those numbers.

[–]fwaht 0 points1 point ago

The analogy is bullshit because you're not interested in explaining the inputs, you're interested in explaining the outputs. The question is, if you know the inner workings of a TV, can you explain what will happen (how it will behave) if Oprah's TV signal is sent to the TV. And the answer, of course, is yes. Your professor is a damned idiot.

[–]specialkake 0 points1 point ago

Well, sorry to throw another metaphor out there, but I believe it's more of a category error. Andy Bell used this metaphor:

This is rather similar to the story of the tourist asking to be shown around the University of Oxford. Having been shown many rooms, lecture theatres, etc., the tourist exclaimed ‘Yes, but where is the University?’ Hence the tourist is making a category error here. The reality of the institution is of a different category to particular rooms, etc. The institution, then, cannot be reduced down to particular rooms, etc. For the idea/reality of the University of Oxford exists at a higher category level than that at which particular observable rooms within it exist.

[–]noodletropin 0 points1 point ago

But you did precisely the same thing in your explanation:

brain chemistry -> neurobiology -> thoughts -> behavior skips an awful lot of those "numbers". Also, a lot of people on this thread are talking about dualism, when there is nothing in OP's description of the professor's stance that hints of dualism.

[–]Shpleeurnck[S] 1 point2 points ago

I'm arguing the idea, not that my progression of topics is perfect.

[–]saintgasoline 0 points1 point ago

I don't really find this kind of argument from intuition convincing. I find it just as plausible to assume that, yes, I would know how to navigate the web if I understood all of its composite parts and their interrelations.

[–]danxmason 1 point2 points ago

Knowing how a horse race works isn't enough to know the winner. You may guess the winner a lot of the time, but you will never know for sure.

[–]Risin 1 point2 points ago

Philosophically speaking, the mind/brain dualism theory says that the physical traits in the brain don't necessarily define, or relate directly to, the mental (and possibly behavioral) traits in the "mind" (spirit, soul, etc. whatever you want to cal it).

[–]Risin 1 point2 points ago

EDIT: In addition, we currently don't know EVERYTHING about the brain and how it functions (i.e. the connections between physical structure, mental thinking, and behavior), so theoretically speaking, it's possible that if we did know everything about the physical characteristics, then we might know everything about the mental-->behavioral connection.

[–]Bearjazz 1 point2 points ago

You kind of have to assume that behavior is deterministic in order to declare experimental analysis of behavior to be a valid science. Otherwise what the hell are you even studying?

I look at it like this; our actions are governed by our nervous system. Our actions change depending on our previous experiences (example: I push a button and get food. I'm more likely to push the button in the future). Either something about experiencing this cause and effect chain changes our brain in some way, through establishing new connections, pruning old ones, strengthening existing ones, or some combination thereof or there is some mechanism independent of our physical brains that does not affect our physical brains but does effect our behavior dependent upon our prior learning. The former requires FAR fewer assumptions and actually has evidence to back it up, while the latter has no evidence.

If behavior weren't deterministic, we wouldn't be able to predict or study it.

[–]mrsamsa 0 points1 point ago

You kind of have to assume that behavior is deterministic in order to declare experimental analysis of behavior to be a valid science. Otherwise what the hell are you even studying?

I think you've confused "deterministic" with "causal". To say that a system is deterministic requires us to assume that given particular inputs, certain outputs will always occur. The problem is that whilst causes do have effects in behavior, there are stochastic and random elements which change the outputs. EAB therefore doesn't assume determinism, but instead assumes probabilism.

This doesn't affect your argument too much as I think your main point is that behavior isn't caused by some non-physical entity like a soul or mind, but rather just pointing out that determinism isn't assumed by EAB so there is no conflict with the professor rejecting the deterministic chain in the OP.

[–]Bearjazz 1 point2 points ago

I'd say that the elements that cause variance in behaviors aren't random. Noisy, certainly, but pseudo-random at best.

For all practical purposes, though, it's safe to treat behavior as probabilistic. It's too complex of a system to account for absolutely EVERY condition.

[–]mrsamsa 0 points1 point ago

I think the elements that cause the variance are random, but just in the mathematical sense of being not completely deterministic. In other words, it's "random" in the same sense that evolution is random. It doesn't mean that it's completely unpredictable and future conditions are unknown as the more colloquial sense of the word "random" implies, of course.

For all practical purposes, though, it's safe to treat behavior as probabilistic.

I'm not sure if you meant to write "deterministic" here, instead of "probabilistic", but I'd agree both ways. For a lot of things, it can be safe to assume that behavior is deterministic. It can be useful and give us meaningful results, like using Newtonian physics to build bridges instead of using Einsteinian physics. But from what we know, behavior appears to be fundamentally probabilistic (i.e. contains an element of randomness) so it's safe to assume it because it seems to be 'true'.

[–]Bearjazz 1 point2 points ago

Theoretically, I'd disagree. Practically, that doesn't matter. Honestly, it's kind of just splitting hairs.

[–]deedlyt 1 point2 points ago

Check out Candice Pert's book Molecules of Emotion. She discusses the biological basis of emotions coming from the interaction of neuropeptides with receptor sites that are located in both the brain and body.

[–]Homotopic 0 points1 point ago

There is a vast difference between behavior -- which is by definition the physical outcome of a system -- and mind and consciousness. Some people have argued that the mind and consciousness can be reduced to purely physical facts, but this position isn't necessarily the most tenable.

For example, suppose Mary, a brilliant human being, is trapped in a black-and-white room with all the physical information she can want about the world, right down to the quarks in a person's head. Now, given these facts, can she know what it is like to see red? Obviously, she can know how a person will behave upon seeing red, but that is not the question; seeing red is a phenomenal experience, like feeling pain. It seems as if after she steps out into the world, and sees a red stop sign, she might say, ``Oh, I could predict beforehand how I would behave upon seeing that stop sign, but I've finally learned what it is like to see the color red, which I something I did not know before.'' If this statement is true, it means that certain aspects of consciousness cannot be reduced to purely physical facts.

[–]Lynzh 0 points1 point ago

You can only study human reactions to its environment, that is human behavior. Human behavior is, how we react to our environment.

This guys explains it a lot better than me link.

[–]DrClem 1 point2 points ago

This is indeed a very interesting conversation. I think this marks the essence of the whole field of psychology. Psychology is in part a study of behaviors and thus your question is right on point.

There are so many different arguments here I wish we have a more organized and mediated debate. Mods should consider having debate events.

Nonetheless, I would like to contribute to the discuss by challenging the OP to revise the question a bit from

If you know everything about how the brain works, to If you know everything about how everything works

Would this revision challenge some of the arguments thus far against the proposition??

[–]Shpleeurnck[S] 1 point2 points ago

That's a good point as I see some people took what I put in the progression to be exactly what I meant instead of simply a small sample.

[–]kris_lace 0 points1 point ago

I'm a computer scientist, but my narrow knowledge of physics persists that only old classical models allowed:

'Understanding of the current state of particles leads to predictions into the future'.

New quantum mechanics disprove this as we can't currently know where all particles (and their respective subatomic sub-parts) are in one time as well as their momentum.

Though it is put forward by quantum theorists that we can know the past from predictions.

TL:DR We can't ever know the present to a strong enough degree to even base a prediction unto the future.

[–][deleted] 1 point2 points ago*

Isn't this just mathematical complexity? That quantified and static systems can output unpredictable results?

EDIT: Chaos theory might be what I am thinking of. Basically, even if you can completely quantify a system (the brain) you can't predict the output for a given input because the system might be extremely sensitive to particular inputs.

Your prof may have added in particles because quantum fluctuations are a source of randomness (slight variations in input) at the electron level. This could every so slight affect how each neuron works, no?

I'm not a shrink or physicists. I am just speculating. The above could be complete bullshit. Just throwing it out there.

[–]Behavioral 0 points1 point ago

The analogy one of my professors told me about the brain:behavior dyad is that of chemistry. Take all the characteristics of Hydrogen and all the characteristics of Oxygen, and tell me how those predict the characteristics of Water. Knowing the parts doesn't necessarily tell you anything about the whole. Knowing a brain's physiology and thought process won't predict a person's behavior because motivation/action selection mediates it.

[–]quackenbush 0 points1 point ago

Bottom line is that we don't know everything about how the brain works. We're. I

[–]eablokker 1 point2 points ago

It's like saying you can predict the weather if you know how all the physics of gases, air pressure, etc. works. Yeah we can predict the weather a few days in advance, but not more than that, and we can predict climate years in advance, but not specific weather events years from now. Is that mysticism to say we can't predict long term weather events? Unpredictability and chaos is an inherent part of any complex organic system, just as well as order also comes into play.

[–]YourCogPsyProf 1 point2 points ago

quarks -> particles -> molecules -> brain chemistry -> neurobiology -> thoughts -> behavior

The way in which different modular neural mechanisms are developed and organized plays a bigger role in thought than pure neurobiology.

Use the "computer analogy"; as an IT professional, knowing what all the parts are to build a computer is one thing, knowing the firmware for them to work properly and knowing how they are supposed to be connected together is another thing entirely.

[–]nashstar 1 point2 points ago

research in psychology suggests that

quarks <-> particles <-> molecules <-> brain chemistry <-> neurobiology <-> thoughts <-> behavior.

among other things

[–]Jose_Monteverde -1 points0 points ago

Conciousness, is untouchable. You can only feel it, in this way conciousness is like faith. However, think about the fact that you are made of the universe and are capable of experience yourself. Psychology major here, I'm also the President of my Psych club at school. I have question, where do u go to school?, check out r/neurophilosophy

[–]Shpleeurnck[S] -1 points0 points ago

I don't think that anything is unknowable or untouchable.

I'm at Georgia Tech.

[–]Jose_Monteverde 0 points1 point ago

what do you mean to know? or touch?

[–]AvgJoeSchmoe -1 points0 points ago

I disagree. I think that, in the future, consciousness will be understood as well as gravity is understood (which is to say not perfectly well, but the scientific body is constantly striving to refine hypotheses and theories that would perfectly describe it).

Also a Psych major, though I'm concentrating in neuroscience. Where do you go to school?

[–]Jose_Monteverde 0 points1 point ago

De Anza College. Conciousness is basically brain waves @ 40hz (read it somewhere, look it up!!)

[–]AvgJoeSchmoe 1 point2 points ago

Lol, hi from Stanford, your neighbor 20 minutes to the north :P

I think I misunderstood what you' said. Are you saying that we can never understand consciousness or are you saying that we can never physically interact with consciousness?

[–]Bearjazz -1 points0 points ago

Ex-president of my school's chapter of Psi Chi (International Honor Society in Psychology) and lab technician in a behavioral analysis laboratory here. Consciousness is all well and good, but that's not what we're talking about here. We're talking about behavior. We don't need to know about an entity's consciousness to predict its behavior.

Take a very basic autoshaping procedure, for instance. Put a pigeon in a box and have a button flash before food is presented. Before too long, the pigeon will peck the light when it flashes, even though it doesn't have to. Working as a lab tech, I've done this with plenty of naive birds. Here's a good example to demonstrate.

The thing about this is we don't need to assume anything about the bird's consciousness to predict this. In fact, it adds an unnecessary step in predicting the behavior to assume anything about an entity's consciousness or thought patterns. At least in predicting behavior, that makes eliminating theorizing about thought patterns and consciousness more parsimonious, since it means we assume less.

Don't get me wrong, the points you raise are very valid (and I think people might be jumping on downvoting your post too quickly). What I'm saying is that the points you raise are the reason why I don't study consciousness or cognition; I study behavior and the neuroscience behind it.

[–]karl_hungas 0 points1 point ago

TIL Birds have consciousness.

[–]cameodemon 1 point2 points ago

but how is consciousness divorced from behavior other than by disciplinary boundaries between cognitive science and neuroscience?

[–]Bearjazz 0 points1 point ago

I'm not saying it is; I'm just saying that it's not necessary to explain consciousness to explain behavior.

[–]Jose_Monteverde 0 points1 point ago

indeed, i agree. With birds we can access a more basic (down to the nuts and bolts)in studying behavior than we can with rats as they have a more evolved cortex (in the continuum that has US on top). Read anything by David Bohm?

[–]Bearjazz 0 points1 point ago

I have not, no. But it's indeed surprising the amount of complex tasks one can teach pigeons to perform.

I shall look up this David Bohm and see what he has written.

[–]deejayposton 0 points1 point ago

How do we even know that memories are "stored"?

[–]Shpleeurnck[S] 0 points1 point ago

The term stored is just a product of the computer model of the brain. As far as I've learned, long-term-potentiation is the closest thing we've seen to explaining learning and memory which suggests there has to be some physical change in the brain for learning to occur. So, memories aren't necessarily stored as files are on a hard drive as maybe they are simply kept.

[–]mrsamsa 0 points1 point ago*

Not sure why you've been downvoted there, as it's a valid question. Memories are not "stored", and that's part of the problem with the computational theory of mind - it leads us to think about these issues in ways which are inaccurate.

[–]deejayposton 1 point2 points ago

I understand how current theories try to relate our brains to computers, but I think in 30 years (hopefully less) we will look back and see how naive we 'were'.

[–]mrsamsa 0 points1 point ago

Well the shift has already begun - very few cognitive researchers today currently believe that the brain is a computer. The only remaining debate between cognitive scientists is whether thinking of the mind as a computer is useful, and the increasing opinion here is that it's not even a very useful analogy.

There's a decent discussion on some of the problems with it here: 10 Important Differences Between Brains and Computers.

[–]deejayposton 1 point2 points ago

that was a fantastic link, thanks

[–]mrsamsa 0 points1 point ago

This progression isn't perfect but that's the idea. This made perfect sense to me but the professor seems to think that simply knowing how everything works isn't enough to understand behavior. This seems to introduce an amount of mysticism into what is, otherwise, strict science. It was like he thought the mind, consciousness, and other such things are untouchable.

It's hard to say exactly what his argument was given the information you've provided, but these were my thoughts.

1) Understanding everything about neurobiology (and all of its underlying processes) obviously isn't enough to understand behavior and cognitive processes. This is because there is an interaction between organism and environment, so (for example) a memory is not "stored" in the brain, instead it is the product of a pattern of environmental, neurobiological and psychological variables.

2) Your system requires that we accept determinism is true, which seems to be unlikely. In other words, behavior is not difficult to predict using deterministic laws because we don't have enough information, but rather that it is indeterministic by its very nature. This is why we use probabilistic laws to describe, explain and predict behavior in experiments. So even if we knew everything we needed to know, it still does not make it possible to predict "X" from knowing "A", "B", and "C".

3) Issues like the "hard problem of consciousness" and "qualia" are things which can only be investigated using first person subjective methods, and science obviously has no way to access these things. Such a field is beyond the remit of science; not in a "mystical" or "spiritual" way, just in a realisation that science is a tool with particular assumptions, axioms and limitations. For example, you wouldn't try to use science to determine what is moral or what is beautiful.

Apologies for doing a little stalking, but if the professor you're talking about is Marr, then as far as I know he certainly isn't a dualist or a woo-head. My best guess is that his argument is [1], and maybe a bit of [2] mentioned above. I'm pretty sure he's argued in the past that issues like consciousness and the mind not only can be investigated and explained by behavior analysis, but that we should actively be doing so.

[–]notdiogenes 0 points1 point ago

Determinism holds that behavior is predictable, in the same idea of the chain you posit.

A hard determinist would say that if you had a sufficiently advanced computer and enough knowledge of the universe's laws and current state, you could predict all outcomes - including those of human behavior. Just as you posit in the chain from quarks to behavior.

However, currently Science does not know enough of the brain's workings to create formulas that predict thoughts, or even much more basic questions!

Free will advocates state that when we do get such advanced knowledge, we will find that there is an interaction from the mind to the brain. That knowing all the rules and starting chemistry won't be enough, there will be room for free will.

Science isn't at a point to test this yet, so its pretty much a theoretical exercise. Personally, I have many friends who are determinists, and I believe in free will (which is the optimal belief anyway hohohoho).

[–]Bearjazz 0 points1 point ago

Genuine question here: how do you define "free will?"

[–]notdiogenes 0 points1 point ago

As the opposite of determinism; the ability to make a choice.

[–]Bearjazz 0 points1 point ago

Determinism allows for choice; just choice that is determined by prior circumstances and current conditions.

[–]notdiogenes 0 points1 point ago

If the choice is determined it isn't much of one, is it? If the choice is the result of chemical reactions in your brain, you only think you have free will. In reality your action are determined by physical laws, and you have no real say in what you do. Free will in this case is an illusion.

[–]Bearjazz 0 points1 point ago

Which is why I don't think it exists.

[–]matholio 0 points1 point ago

I think this is similar to expecting to fully grok weather and fluid dynamics, because you understand water and energy. You can build better and better models which work at certain levels, but there always another level of resolution which the model doesn't cater for.

The following probably applies to some degree. "If you wish to make an apple pie from scratch, you must first invent the universe." - Carl Sagen

[–]merebrillante 0 points1 point ago

It's not mysticism, it really is science why your progression won't lead to a complete understanding of behavior. Simply stated, humans (and thus their behaviors) are open-system organisms.

[–]Shpleeurnck[S] -1 points0 points ago

The mysticism part was referring to when my professor stated that where behavior comes from is unknowable.

[–]merebrillante 0 points1 point ago

Well, then, yeah, your professor was ... wrong. Behavior is a result of genetic biology, non-genetic biology, psychological stressors, and social and cultural norms.

[–]marrymetaylor -1 points0 points ago

It's not really turning to mysticism. It's more that it's nearly impossible for us to take EVERY aspect of/cause for a behavior. Also there are still fuckloads of things we don't know about nearly everything.

[–]CharAznable -1 points0 points ago

You're the one assuming we know everything.

[–]Shpleeurnck[S] -1 points0 points ago

I mean if we knew everything, could we predict behavior?

[–]CharAznable 0 points1 point ago

Sure, if we were omniscient.

[–]mrsamsa 0 points1 point ago

We don't need to know everything to predict behavior, we can already predict behavior in controlled conditions with extreme accuracy. For perfect prediction, we'd need knowledge of everything. (And of course it'd be impossible to ever perfectly predict behavior in uncontrolled conditions, no matter how much we know about the brain).

[–]notdiogenes 0 points1 point ago

Science doesn't know enough to answer this yet.

If the determinists are right, then yes.